The Modern Library – 100 Best Nonfiction Books

The Modern Library – 100 Best Nonfiction Books

I find it encouraging that the top of the Reader’s List includes

• The Virtue of Selfishness (it is, in fact, ranked #1) and
• Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand.

Yes, the list also includes some works promoting bad ideas (or the absence of ideas as is the case with the #2 slot), and the presence of Objectivist works doesn’t imply any sort of wide endorsement, but it’s apparent that these books are not only read but also held in high regard.

The ideas are spreading, and people are receptive of them.

Club Information

The first meeting of the University of Michigan Students of Objectivism club went very well. The club will take on a “study group” type format, with the book of choice being Ayn Rand’s Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology. We will be discussing chapter one on the first Wednesday after break (March 4th). Once again, the meeting will be held in room “Blagdon” on the first floor of the League. The room is in the back (if entering from North University St.), all the way down the main hallway.

New members, feel free to stop in and meet everyone. Doing the reading is not a requirement for attending meetings!

-Adam Gaglio

First Meeting of the Year!

I’m pleased to announce that the University of Michigan Students of Objectivism club will be having its first meeting of the new year tomorrow (Wednesday, February 18th) at 7:00 P.M. in Blagdon room on the first floor of the league. See you there!

-Adam Gaglio

January 21st Meeting and Beyond

First, I want to apologize for my delayed follow up message in response to our January 21st meeting at Amer’s. I thought we had a nice turnout, especially considering the several month hiatus of the club. I enjoyed our discussion, and was excited to see the eagerness of new members to revive the club.

For those of you who could not attend, I wanted to quickly sum up the points we addressed at our discussion.

1. The club is currently lacking a proper Executive Committee, that is, student members to fill the roles of President, Vice-President, and Treasurer. In order to schedule future meetings in University rooms, and reserve auditoriums for any future lecture events, we need to fill these roles. Thankfully, I have been approached by current members who are interested in taking on the positions, so I will be working with them in the coming week.
2. Taking into account the interests of those who attended the meeting and those who have contacted me, I propose that we put together bimonthly meetings for topic discussions. These discussions can focus on:
   • Short pieces written by members that explore and present on a subject of Objectivism.
   • Texts that can facilitate a study group, e.g.,
     • Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand (Peikoff)
     • Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology (Rand)
     • Objectivism In One Less (Bernstein) (Steve might be able to add some better insight about this book)
   • General questions of inquiry, in the example of Leonard Peikoff’s podcast series (see peikoff.com or the iTunes link)

I’ve also been in contact with Tom Wright, who has generously administered the ownership ofumso.org over the years, about the future of our website.

I’ll try to deliver sometime this weekend some more concrete information about the club’s next steps.

Closed System vs. Open System: Why the Open System Fails (Part 5 of 5)

(Previous posts in the series: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4 )

Why the Closed System is Misunderstood, and the Strawmen that are Associated with It

Now that I’m through with the open system, I’d like to focus on explaining what the closed system is. Specifically I’d like to do this by contrasting it to what it is not.

I think several factors are responsible for misunderstanding the closed system:

1. Besides Peikoff’s essay “Fact and Value,” there is little material that discusses the closed system from the perspective of a defender, which leaves us to figure it out for ourselves (and we unfortunately get it wrong sometimes, or even oftentimes). For evidence of faulty conclusions drawn from insufficient information, read Kirsti Minsaas’ letter to Harry Binswanger, particularly the last five paragraphs: http://folk.uio.no/thomas/po/minsaas-letter.html

To my knowledge, a few of Diana Hsieh’s blogposts on “The Many False Friends of Objectivism” are the most extensive works on the internet in defense of the closed system, so I would advise people to read those, including the first one I’m going to list, as it asks interesting questions which people inquiring about the closed system should look into. (In particular, “Questions and Comments on the Closed System,” “Ayn Rand on David Kelley,” and “The Open System, One More Time.”)

2. Conflating the closed system perspective with an evasion of truth, independent thinking, rationality, etc. This view implies (and sometimes explicitly states) that since closed system advocates are focusing on “official authorized texts” and closing the system off from revisions, they must be deifying Ayn Rand and/or Leonard Peikoff as authorities to be dogmatically accepted and followed.  Kelley basically characterizes Peikoff’s view of the closed system, when applied to real Objectivists, as precisely a choice between accepting Objectivism as true, even when facts suggest otherwise (the “dogmatic” approach) and giving up Objectivism when we disagree with even the “least fundamental” of the philosophy’s ideas. (p. 77 )

I think what’s important here is that there are two perspectives that should be taken into account: (1) the perspective of discovering and following the truth, and (2) the perspective of recognizing the identity of Objectivism.

In regards to the truth, one uses one’s own mind to figure out the truth of ideas and works, whether it is authoritative of some philosophy (e.g. Rand’s works) or not. This is the proper perspective when determining the validity of Objectivism (or anything else), as you are letting the evidence and inferences drawn guide you to reach conclusions with certainty.

From the perspective of the closed system, however, the issue is delimiting the identity of Objectivism, rejecting new additions to the philosophy in accordance with this “delimiting” procedure, and distinguishing derivative works as either “extended Objectivism/related to Objectivism” or not depending on the coherence of the work with the authoritative sources on the philosophy.

Determining what “Objectivism” is, and determining if it is true, are thus two different tasks. In contrast to the person discovering truth, the person who wants to know what Objectivism is should consult the primary works, and then carefully analyze derivative works to determine if they cohere with the primary works before reaching a verdict about them being in the “Objectivist tradition” or not.

In fact, I believe the “closed system” approach is how Objectivists convinced of the truth of their philosophy should approach other philosophies, like if one is studying in the field of philosophy in college. The fact that an Objectivist would disagree with Hume doesn’t mean that he shouldn’t consult Hume’s actual works to learn about his philosophy, and afterward uses these works as a “litmus test” for derivative works which claim to be in the “Humean tradition.”

3. Ignorance (honest or deliberate) of what closed system advocates are doing. One of the strawmen I’ll discuss later in this post is that the closed system, in closing off the system to additions and revisions, thus limits our ability to learn more about Objectivism.

If this is true, then what has the Ayn Rand Institute been doing all this time, with its lectures, Op-Ed campaigns, and Objectivist Conference lectures? What is Objectivism: the Philosophy of Ayn Rand, if not a resource that allows us to extend our knowledge of Objectivism substantially? I’ll say more on this when I get to the strawmen.

4. Thinking that “Objectivism” is a concept, which in turn leads one to reject the (previously) bad argument that “Objectivism” is a proper noun. In truth, there couldn’t be a concept for “Objectivism,” just as there’s no concept for Aristotle’s philosophy (or “Aristotle,” for that matter). “Objectivism” refers to a definite set of principles which one grasps by understanding the ideas within the philosophy. There’s no measurement-omission involved in grasping the term “Objectivism”; there aren’t two referents from which measurements can be abstracted. But differentiation is involved in regards to other philosophies. One’s knowledge about a proper noun like “Objectivism” can differ, but there’s still only one set of ideas which is “Objectivism.”

The old argument used to be that since “Objectivism” is capitalized, it is therefore a proper noun which refers to Ayn Rand’s philosophy. Besides being a empty, rationalistic argument, it doesn’t dig deep enough into what a proper noun is. To my recollection, Mike Mazza was the first person to speak of “abstract particulars” on the internet, which allowed him to grasp why “Objectivism” and other sets of ideas are proper nouns rather than concepts. As Diana Hsieh noted in the interview I linked in Part 1, it’s a technical point of epistemology, as it subsumes concepts, proper nouns, theories, laws, and possibly other mental contents; further, Ayn Rand didn’t publish anything on it, so it isn’t a part of the Objectivist epistemology (though I think it is logically consistent with it). As this is new territory, I can see why this aspect of the closed system is so misunderstood.

5. Not understanding what a “philosophic principle” is; which means not knowing the scope of philosophic issues (i.e. what counts as a philosophic principle), and/or not knowing the nature of principles (i.e. what counts as a philosophic principle). (I really have to thank Diana Hsieh for bringing this to my attention in her blogpost “The Open System, One More Time.”)

I think this is a big factor in generating strawmen, including a couple I’ll address momentarily.

Now to criticize some of the strawmen which are floating around (especially on the internet), distorting what the closed system is:

1. Closed system means that “Ayn Rand has said everything in philosophy and thus ‘philosophy’ is closed to additions, new ideas, etc.”

I suppose I should say that I’m going from “most ridiculous strawman” to “strawman that misses some key insight, though not a terribly bad strawman.”

First of all, the whole “Open/Closed system” issue was exclusively about the identity of Objectivism—what constitutes it.  Obviously, Ayn Rand hasn’t “said everything in philosophy”; she admits there are areas she hadn’t touched on and that she didn’t seem to have any intention to (e.g. Philosophy of Law). Philosophy in general is open to all kinds of new viewpoints, Objectivist or not, and people are going to disagree with Rand on all kinds of philosophical topics (including the people who already have), and a few will even generate entirely new philosophies. This is such a gross misrepresentation of the “closed system” position that it’s more like meaningless noise than a faulty characterization.

2. We must accept everything that Ayn Rand wrote and never question it, for fear of becoming a “non-Objectivist.”

Agreement with the principles of Objectivism is the only requirement for being an “Objectivist.” Rand wrote on many topics, some philosophical, some pertaining to other subjects, and even those statements in philosophy are not all about philosophical generalizations. There are many things one could disagree with Rand about and still be an Objectivist. A person who seeks conformity with a certain group or title and avoids questioning it out of fear of not conforming is certainly not an Objectivist, or an advocate of any set of ideas, as he obviously has not appraised the facts with his own mind to determine their truth.

3. The closed system stifles a person’s mind by requiring him to adhere to authorized texts, on pain of rejecting “Objectivism”; this results in the independent thinker having to reject the philosophy whenever a disagreement emerges. Kelley, I think, originated this strawman: “To be Objectivists, in other words, we must abandon rationality; to be rational, we must be ready at any moment to abandon Objectivism.” (T&T, p. 77)

The closed system, contra Kelley, allows one’s mind to identify what Objectivism is, and properly distinguish it from derivative/unrelated works (the ideas of which may or may not be consistent with the philosophy of Objectivism), which is a benefit for one’s cognitive faculty. The result from not meeting this cognitive need can be seen in sub-groups such as “Christian Objectivists,” who blatantly support principles diametrically opposed to those formulated by Rand, and yet still want to keep the name “Objectivist.” Of course, the logical conclusion of the open system must include Christian Objectivists as “Objectivists,” since basically “anything goes,” as I’ve argued (or to be more exact: “nothing goes”).

As far as rejecting the philosophy when disagreements occur: well, if the disagreement can’t be resolved, then the person should, in reason, give up Objectivism and only keep the elements he still accepts.  I agree with Diana that it’s an “expression of tribalism” to keep a label or remain in a group by redefining the terms which one first agreed with.

Further, the closed system allows one to learn more about Objectivism, not restricting him to only reading a few “canonical texts.” With the closed system, the person can accurately identify what “Objectivism” is, and use this understanding to further his knowledge of the philosophy by comparing his knowledge to the work of future intellectuals and scholars (e.g. Tara Smith).

I’ve argued that it is the open system which, in effect, stifles the mind by offering the advocate no cognitive means of knowing what sources, if any, are in accordance with the Objectivist philosophy; which leaves him to figure it out for himself (or change it at will).

Making certain works “authoritative” simply means that these works came from the originator of a system or is endorsed by her, and these are the definitive sources from which to learn about some subject; it certainly doesn’t mean that someone must now accept the works uncritically as the “truth”; which means Kelley is equivocating on the meaning of “authority.” In different contexts, “authority” can mean a definitive source for information, and it can sometimes mean someone whose statements are accepted uncritically by yes-men, and Kelley wishes to use both while denouncing closed system advocates.

(Comment: I personally think this is very dishonest of Kelley, especially for a person who’s been involved in academia (and Introductory Logic courses) and should know better than to commit logical fallacies. Of course, by the method of cost-benefit analysis supported and practiced by Kelley, maybe such a mischaracterization and insult of Peikoff and the closed system advocates outweighed the possibility of the fallacy being exposed and the reduction of the scholarly level of his book.)

4. Kelley’s definition of the closed system: “A closed system, by contrast, is defined by specific articles of faith, usually laid out in some canonical text. Internal debates are highly constrained and usually short-lived; they are typically settled by a ruling from some authority.” (p. 72)

I’ve already explained what a “closed system” is, though I will note that religious systems which make believers accept their edicts on faith is one category of a “closed system.” In general, a “closed system” is concerned with identifying the constitution of a given integrated set of ideas; it is irrelevant in this context whether the system is to be accepted by reason (e.g. a philosophy) or by faith (e.g. religion). Kelley’s definition therefore is not wrong per se, since what he describes is one kind of a closed system; his definition, as he proceeds to apply it to Peikoff and to the other closed system advocates of Objectivism, however, is a textbook example of the fallacy of the frozen abstraction.
(Here’s Rand’s definition, for those who need a refresher on that fallacy: http://www.aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/frozenabstraction.html )
Here, he takes a particular type of closed system (religious authoritarian systems) and substitutes it for the concept “closed system” as such, using his version as if it were the only one which could possibly exist. In fact, this is how he uses the term for all of chapter 5 on “Objectivism.”

It’s quite unfortunate, as I think this is the most used of the strawmen concerning what people think the “closed system” viewpoint must be—and I’m becoming certain that we have David Kelley’s use of fallacies in that chapter to thank for that.

5. Objectivism as a closed system means the integrated principles and Rand’s applications of those principles; the implication being that a wrong application means the invalidation of the philosophy.
Here’s an example provided by “critic of Objectivism” Robert Campbell (using his words except for one phrase in brackets for clarity):
“And [the system of Objectivism] must be dead, in its turn, because a single false ‘philosophical’ proposition in the Randian corpus gives Randians the choice between deliberately accepting a system that includes falsehoods, or hitting the road out of Rand-land. Rand’s belief that newborn infants experience pure sensations has turned out to be false; she enunciated it as part of her epistemology; therefore, the whole ’system’ is already dead.”
http://www.objectivistliving.com/forums/index.php?s=&showtopic=5604&view=findpost&p=50193

The closed system does not include Rand’s applications of her philosophy, but rather the axioms and principles which integrate it into a system of thought. To undercut Objectivism, one would need to discover something wrong with one of its principles, not with its applications. The fact that babies don’t experience sensations doesn’t refute any of the principles within Objectivism: particularly, it doesn’t refute the fact that discriminated awareness, the perceptual level of consciousness, is the epistemically given. It’s simply a mistake Rand made in applying her principles. Notice that the example is actually a technical point of psychology or neuro-biology, not some fundamental insight in philosophy.

6. Lastly: Objectivism means everything that Ayn Rand ever said or thought. (Hat tip to Diana for pointing this one out)

This makes it impossible to make a distinction between philosophic principles espoused by Rand, applications of such, or opinions on a host of non-philosophical topics (e.g. her critique of the “open mind/closed mind issue” or her opinion on the philosophical merit of the Logical Positivists
http://www.aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/openmindandclosedmind.html
http://www.aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/logicalpositivism.html).

To answer this strawman, one must keep in mind what a philosophy is, and what it is for: a form of system that covers fundamental issues of our lives and that is tasked with offering a person the means to deal with real-life problems over a lifetime.

This delimits substantially what can actually count as “philosophy,” and therefore “Objectivism.” Specifically, it amounts to fundamental principles and ideas expressed by a particular philosopher in regards to his philosophy, not his particular applications of those principles, and definitely not his opinions and views on non-philosophical topics.

I think I’ve already covered the issue of what Objectivism is enough to not explain it again here, but understanding the boundaries of philosophy would be very helpful in exposing this strawman.

Conclusion
This concludes my series criticizing the “open system” and David Kelley while arguing in favor of the “closed system,” and my reasons for doing so.

Roderick Fitts is a former Vice-President of the University of Michigan Students of Objectivism.

Closed System vs. Open System: Why the Open System Fails (Part 4 of 5)

(Previous in the series: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3)

David Kelley, the “Knowledge as Contextual” Principle, and the Destruction of Systems

In Truth & Toleration, Kelley implied that the open system’s policy of modifying principles within Objectivism was a natural consequence of the principle that knowledge is contextual, which means in essence that “[h]uman knowledge on every level is relational.” (L. Peikoff, Objectivism: the Philosophy of Ayn Rand, p. 122 ) Kelley states that such modifications, reformulations, and qualifications have been “part of the brief history of Objectivism to date,” and that such changes should be “expected in light of the Objectivist theory that knowledge is contextual.” (T&T, p. 77 )

I challenge Kelley’s claim, however.

Assuming the open system had a justification for changing principles in the first place, if a person discovered a context that mandated the modification of a principle, adhering to the “knowledge as contextual” principle would require him to call into question all of the Objectivist principles, as they would have some type of relationship with this incorrect principle.

Let’s assume, for instance, that some future fact throws suspicion on the principle that rights can only be violated by the initiation of force—something points an open system advocate towards the conclusion that force does not violate rights (I wouldn’t know what fact; it is the task of open system advocates to show us why we can’t be certain of such principles). If this were followed through, then the validity of other principles would become suspect as well, if one followed the “knowledge as contextual” principle, among them:
(1) The principle that the government’s task is to protect individual rights by retaliating against the initiation of force. If we can’t determine what actions actually violate our rights, how can we expect a bunch of bureaucrats to do so, and what would be our justification?
(2) The principle that the initiation of physical force is a form of evil. Rights connect morality to one’s social existence, protecting one against immoral actions by others. But if rights no longer serve this function (uses of force no longer constitute violations of rights), it implies that people don’t really need to be free from others’ brutal interference, making one wonder exactly why physical force was deemed evil in the first place.
(3) The principle that “Man’s Life” as the standard of moral value. The moral is the right, Objectivism counsels, but physical force doesn’t violate rights (the counter-example I gave above), though force still impairs one’s ability to live (assuming that “seeing is believing”); if certain things which negate or impair life are not morally evil, are not disvalues, then “man’s life” doesn’t seem to be the appropriate standard for determining moral values.

Ultimately, the validity of the entire system would have to be called into question by this advocate, precisely because the reasons given for the validity of the principles, and the principles themselves, are so tightly integrated; consequently, this integration is weakened when one of the principles is removed. The advocate would find it necessary to eventually change the entire character of the philosophy, turning it into something deserving its own name. The “knowledge as contextual” principle would mean that a change in one element of the philosophic principles must logically lead to the transformation of the philosophy into some other philosophy—in other words, “any change in any element…would destroy the entire system.” (Leonard Peikoff, Fact and Value; see online here:
http://www.aynrand.org/site/PageServer?pagename=objectivism_fv )

Kelley offers no principled rebuttal to Peikoff’s claim that philosophies, as integrated wholes, cannot withstand a change in one of their principles. He protests that an Objectivist philosopher may disagree with Rand on some “particular point,” and that this doesn’t necessarily lead to a rejection of all the logically related principles. (p. 79 ) Read literally, I agree: “particular point” could mean a host of issues that Rand discussed, philosophical or otherwise; I disagree with Rand on the neurological/psychological topic of babies experiencing a sensation stage, but I don’t think this has bearing on the truth of Rand’s philosophical principles. Rather I think it is a misapplication of her view of perceptions/sensations (specifically, it doesn’t invalidate the heavily related principle that the perceptual level is the epistemically given and the self-evident, or “directly experienced”).

(For another example of Kelley’s failure to address Peikoff’s principle on integrated philosophical systems, see Diana Hsieh’s blog post “The Open System, One More Time,” found here: http://www.dianahsieh.com/blog/2005/12/open-system-one-more-time.html )

Assuming we’re discussing a philosophical principle here, I find it absurd that Kelley expects us to disprove any alteration that an Objectivist may decide to undertake, with or without argument on his part beforehand. (Kelley says that “[i]t may well be that he takes the position he does because he regards it as the true implications of [other, logically related] principles,” and then challenges us to “prove him wrong” if we disagree with him. p. 79; bold mine, italics in original) The fact that Kelley doesn’t even say that the objector’s argument has to be true, or forceful in its logic, only increases the absurdity of his demands.

To be clear, I regard this as absurd because we would need an entire department or more of knowledgeable Objectivists to correct and/or disprove well-reasoned out objections by supposed Objectivists whom offer alternative principles that could be integrated into Objectivism: which is bad enough; to have to show why fallacious or even outright crazy departures of Objectivism are wrong as well is way beyond unreasonable.

(Comment: If a student of Objectivism, or an Objectivist who’s having second doubts about his philosophy, thinks that Rand is mistaken in one of her philosophic principles, then he should critically think about what this mistake implies about the rest of the philosophy. He should relate it to the rest of his knowledge, and even consult well-versed Objectivists to help him see if he’s mistaken. If he concludes that he is logically right, then he should honestly give up the term “Objectivist” while giving credit to Rand for whatever insights from her he still believes to be true. I can certainly respect such a man, who practices intellectual honesty by approaching ideas seriously and who refuses to accept labels for a set of ideas he disagrees with (even if I think he’s in error). )

Contra Kelley, we can “assume in advance, without argument [supporting the objector’s view]” that an alteration of some positions (philosophic principles) would destroy the system, because we are capable of thinking in terms of principles—specifically epistemological principles. (T&T, p. 79 ) We can understand how principles relate to and depend on other principles, and realize that only a haphazard mess of ideas could withstand having one of its elements changed. We can induce from these processes of cognition a contextually certain principle: that the nature of philosophical systems rules out changing an element within the system and keeping the rest of it intact—the result from such alterations must be the fracturing of the system’s integrity, weakening of the remaining principles’ strength and meaning, and ultimately the destruction of the system.
(Comment: Emphasis on “can” here: we don’t have to assume without argument that someone’s alteration obliterates the system. If an Objectivist is willing to engage an objector’s alteration, and prove to him how it must destroy the system, he is free to do so. I’m simply challenging Kelley’s skeptical remark that we can’t be sure if any change in a philosophy would trash the system. It seems the skepticism in Kelley’s position truly runs deep.)

I believe Kelley’s objection to Peikoff, that systems can be modified without necessarily destroying them, stems from a deeper issue: Kelley’s mistaken view of the “knowledge as contextual” principle.

Applied to his open system, Kelley thinks the principle counsels us to revise and change principles as new “contexts” (e.g. evidence, facts) demand, while keeping certain aspects (such as his “list”) intact.

In fact, the “knowledge as contextual” principle informs us that we must integrate all of our knowledge, and that we must never drop the context: or in this case, we must never forget that philosophic systems are integrations and that their elements can never be “dropped” without wrecking that integration.

To ignore this principle, as the open system advocates must, means to engage in the worst kind of compartmentalization: improper specialization in the field which seeks to integrate all of human knowledge—philosophy.

The Open System as a Rejection of Objectivism as an Integrated System

This final section on the open system is a conclusion.

The majority of this paper has argued that the following are flaws within the open system viewpoint:
(1) The arbitrary elevation of philosophic principles to the status of scientific principles.
(2) The mistaken “need” to then rework, qualify, and otherwise change Objectivist principles.
(3) The skepticism of the truth of Objectivism.
(4) The resulting skepticism of philosophical principles as such.
(5) The rejection of the view that philosophies are integrated systems that are destroyed upon alteration.

It is because of these flaws that the open system advocates could not logically uphold Objectivism as an integrated system—i.e. a philosophy.

For any philosophy, whether true (internally and externally consistent) or not, its principles and the connections within are simply a part of its identity, even if they contradict reality.

Any change within the principles which are connected in a system would contradict other elements and principles, creating even more contradictions—the resolutions of which would completely alter the philosophy’s nature—as was argued previously.

The open system advocates seek to change Objectivism into what they think it should be, into what they think is “the truth,” but this seeking, in the context of what philosophical systems are, is self-defeating: whatever original principles by Rand they initially accepted (or due to the skepticism, at least believed were a part of Objectivism, including Kelley’s list) would eventually need revision to make the system internally consistent in the view of the advocate.

Kelley’s protestations to the contrary, the open system viewpoint must amount to “the freedom to rewrite Objectivism as one wishes.” (p. 80)

While the open system advocate may try to restructure Objectivism to fit whatever alterations he makes, he has to be skeptical of the truth of all principles (since a “new context” is ever-present), whether he thinks they are a part of Objectivism, or some new (or old) principle he wants to fit into the existing structure; if he even gets far enough to integrating principles (which I doubt), he can’t be certain that they are true—i.e. which means he can’t really think they’re principles, and hence that they can be integrated.

Whatever jumbled mess of ideas the advocate eventually formulates (if he doesn’t give up the task in despair and/or leave Objectivism for a different philosophy), the result certainly cannot be an integrated system.

More importantly in this context, it cannot be Objectivism.

Concluding remarks

I agree with Peikoff and Kelley that “objectivity” is the central disputed issue in the “open/closed system split”; Kelley’s submerged skepticism, arbitrary outline for what is essential to Objectivism, and his misunderstanding of the “knowledge as contextual principle” all point to him being the one who has misunderstood the concept “objectivity,” not Peikoff.

In my view, it is the closed system which has earned the right to be the “objective” approach in understanding what “Objectivism” is.

(Later in the series: Part 5)

Roderick Fitts is a former Vice-President of the University of Michigan Students of Objectivism.

Closed System vs. Open System: Why the Open System Fails (Part 3 of 5)

(Previous in the series: Part 1, Part 2)

Why I Don’t Accept Kelley’s “Outline” as Essential to the Open System Claim

In chapter 5 of Truth & Toleration, Kelley lays out what he takes to be the essence of Objectivism as a philosophy (in the section “What is Objectivism?” pages 81-84 ). He claims “anyone who accepted all of these ideas would have to consider himself an Objectivist.” (p. 84) So for Kelley, the list he develops is closed to the revisions he regards as possible (or more likely necessary) to other philosophical points made by Rand that he omits from his list. To support this, in Appendix B of T&T, Kelley says “[Objectivism] is even open to revisions in light of new evidence, as long as [the revisions] are consistent with the central principles of the philosophy, such as the efficacy of reason and the individual’s right to live for his own happiness.” (p. 121; italics mine)

I view this closing off of certain principles from revision, and Kelley’s desire to have a philosophy which is distinct from other philosophies, as inconsistent with the broader open system viewpoint, at best; at worst, it blatantly contradicts that viewpoint and defeats the purpose of advocating an open system in the first place.

Kelley’s reasons (on p. 84 ) for keeping certain principles and insights free from the “process of inquiry” are:

(1) To “distinguish Objectivism from every other viewpoint.”
(2) To “identify the boundaries of the debate and development that may take place within Objectivism as a school of thought.”
(3) And to determine Objectivists from non-Objectivists.

In light of Kelley’s conflation between scientific and philosophic principles, his argument that we should keep certain principles anyway is completely baseless, no matter the reason he gives; on his scientific/philosophic view, it is only a matter of time before some new fact or perspective will invalidate one of the principles he has deemed “essential.”

(Comment: This is supported by his claim about how small the Objectivist literature is, and I infer from Kelley’s perspective that since the philosophy did not address all issues in philosophy, making it tightly integrated in all branches, it is less likely that its fundamental principles won’t undergo some form of change in some future date. See page 76 of T&T )

A consistent open system advocate would only keep principles that were proven to be true; in this regard, it wouldn’t matter if some (or indeed all) of Objectivism’s principles were embraced by other philosophies and it lost its “distinctive character.” The open system advocate would probably claim that it is Objectivism’s particular way of integrating its principles that makes it the “true philosophy”; the other philosophies, while having some true principles, are not integrated properly and are consequently false.

As far as the “boundaries”: I think this would be absurd to the consistent open system advocate. The only proper “boundaries” which determine positions taken in the debate and the development of Objectivism in the consistent viewpoint would be: the facts of reality. On the open system view, if a person does show that a principle upheld by Kelley is mistaken and should be discarded, and he’s right in doing so, then how could this not be a “development within Objectivism”?

And lastly, the supposed need to distinguish Objectivists from non-Objectivists: Kelley doesn’t give any reasons grounded in facts for keeping his list of what is essential to Objectivism; meaning his distinction of who is or isn’t an Objectivist is of no cognitive help. Going by my own analysis, the open system viewpoint in practice would state that anyone who sought truth in philosophy and accepted the axioms would be an “Objectivist”; there could really be only three kinds of people who were “non-Objectivists”:

(1) People disinterested in philosophy.
(2) People interested in philosophy (whether truth or otherwise) but who reject one or more of the axioms.
(3) People who accept the axioms but don’t seek truth in their philosophical pursuits. (Maybe they just want a mash of ideas to prop up their preconceived notions, who knows?)

Even if there were other kinds of people who could qualify as “non-Objectivists,” my essential point on this sub-issue is that Kelley’s justification for his distinction doesn’t coincide with the open system viewpoint as defended in his underlying view of science and philosophy.

There’s a reason why I’ve been comparing Kelley’s views here to the “consistent open system advocate”: insofar as Kelley holds to his outline, he is not in fact an open system advocate. If I had included Kelley’s outline as essential to the open system viewpoint, it would completely fall apart on even moderate inspection. Kelley’s outline is an unjustified variation of the closed system theme, and at best gives us one indication of why one can’t simultaneously be an “open system advocate” and claim to have some kind of philosophy: as I’ll argue later, the former extinguishes the possibility of the later.

Why the Open System Needs to Conflate the “Philosophic Principle/Scientific Principle” Issue

The open system viewpoint is logically consequent of Kelley’s views regarding philosophic and scientific principles, particularly applied to what this would mean about Objectivism. If the blending of these different forms of principles were indeed necessary (i.e. if Kelley was right and they really weren’t different), then it would imply that Objectivist principles could become invalidated by future evidence; the avoidance of this would be the justification of–and the essential task for–the open system viewpoint.

(Comment: I’ll note but won’t comment here on another presupposition of the open system: that it has the right to rewrite philosophical systems when it disagrees with the philosophy’s author, all for the sake of “truth”, “objectivity” or to adhere to Kelley’s mistaken view of the principle that “knowledge is contextual,” which I’ll address later; or the presupposition that one couldn’t just abandon the old system which needs revision and develop a new and more rigorously true philosophy.)

The closed system, as I understand it, wouldn’t concern itself with this possibility (I’m still assuming that Kelley’s view of principles is correct here, just for the sake of argument); if Objectivism will eventually become invalid, then its response to any honest inquirer would in effect be the same response it would give if the assumption were false: “use whatever Objectivist principles and insights you think are true, and discard false ideas while giving appropriate credit; but give up calling yourself an ‘Objectivist’ once you don’t advocate all of its principles anymore.”

But as I’ve argued earlier (see Part 2), Kelley’s mixing of these two types of principles was in error, and I believe this is the essential error with the open system, its fatal error. Because this presupposition of the open system was wrong, there is no justifiable, philosophically grounded reason for its advocates to revise Objectivist principles.

The underlying reason that I haven’t yet given for the need to conflate these principles is that the open system needs to invoke skepticism of the truth of Objectivism in order to bolster its claim that certain principles should be redefined, revised, or otherwise re-organized. What reason could be given for changing principles one is convinced to be certainly true?

In short, the open system needs the science/philosophy principle conflation to invoke skepticism of the truth of Objectivist principles, since the possibility of Objectivism being wrong in the future necessitates (in their view) revising and reformulating principles, which is only possible in the open system viewpoint.

Why this attempt fails, I’ll discuss in the next section.

(Comment: My statement about the open system and its skepticism of Objectivism’s truth should not be taken to mean that all closed system advocates, on the other hand, must be certain of Objectivism’s truth to properly be advocates. A closed system advocate could be a student of Objectivism who wants to discover if Objectivism is in fact true, but has learned enough about it to discredit the open system viewpoint, such as myself. As I’ll explain later, complete certainty of (or dogmatic faith in) Objectivism is not a prerequisite for supporting the closed system; the claim about dogmatic faith was in fact a strawman constructed by David Kelley in this sentence: “A closed system, by contrast, is defined by specific articles of faith, usually laid out in some canonical text.” [Truth and Toleration, 2nd ed., Ch. 5, p. 72] )

(Another Comment: Interesting observation: the closed system’s primary concern is clarifying what Objectivism is, so that the inquirer can cognitively distinguish it from other philosophies or developments; while the open system is primarily concerned with keeping Objectivism consistent with reality, clarifications of its identity [e.g. Kelley's “list”] or not. Under the open system, as a result, “Objectivism” is whatever principles [integrated or not] people have determined for themselves to be true in addition to advocating the axioms. By ruling out the possibility of even defining what Objectivism is, it prevents one from being certain of what Objectivism’s identity is, and discourages a successful attempt at contrasting it with other philosophies.)

Skepticism of Principles as the Necessary Result of the Open System View
I just noted that the open system covertly uses skepticism of the truth of Objectivism as an excuse for revising and adapting its principles to fit the future data of reality. This is, I believe, essential to the open system viewpoint, and I second Diana Hsieh’s remark that:

Ultimately, so much of the motivation for the open system seems to boil down to the tired skeptical refrain of ‘But what if you’re wrong?!?’ — only now it’s ‘But what if Ayn Rand was wrong?!?’ and ‘Ohmigod, what will we do then?!?’ ” (See: http://www.dianahsieh.com/blog/2005/07/ayn-rand-on-david-kelley.html ; bold mine )

Because the open system’s view of principles is mistaken, the necessary result is epistemological skepticism in regard to knowing when one has a valid principle.

In science, it is proper to test theories in all types of ways and with new data, technology, and knowledge because the nature of scientific subjects requires constantly learning more and testing more to determine the ultimate causal mechanism(s) of a given subject. Every advance means a new way to test established and new theories (and hypotheses) alike, which leads to further knowledge and increases the likelihood of someone discovering the truth. But with philosophical topics, the data needed to determine the truth of a given principle requires no special research or equipment, and is available in any era of human history, as others and myself have argued. If we are to accept that even well-grounded principles are subject to possible revision, reformulation, etc. in light of “new data,” then how can we ever know when we’ve reached a valid principle?

My contention is that once one has properly grounded a principle, it stands as a contextual-absolute that he can be certain of. Because future advances in human knowledge and technology are irrelevant to philosophical investigation as such, there wouldn’t be a need to reassess one’s principle in light of such advances. The decision to consider reformulating a principle one regarded as knowledge would only make sense if one had a reason for thinking that it didn’t apply to some case (e.g. if there really was a concept which, on reflection, didn’t seem to need measurement-omission to be formed). And even then, the proposed counter-example does not necessarily demonstrate that the principle is wrong and should be revised.

Consider the case of emergencies, where one’s circumstances effectively eliminate the ability of choosing life-furthering actions: since morality is within the province of choice, the morality of rational egoism strictly doesn’t apply to those cases, according to Objectivism. Do these cases refute the principle that rational egoism is the proper means of guiding one’s life—or do they simply highlight the scope of the principle’s valid application?

In fact, Kelley offers us no means of determining what conditions make a change or qualification to a philosophic principle necessary; he merely asserts that the future data, which represents a “change of context,” (my phrase) will make principles subject to them. (p. 78 ) Unfortunately, he doesn’t even concretize how a change/revision to a principle not on his list would go about, as this would have allowed us to analyze the example and show how it is mistaken.

(Comment: I don’t consider Kelley’s moral differences from Peikoff’s view (e.g. on tolerance) as examples of changing/revising existing Objectivist principles, in his view. Kelley basically thinks that his view is consistent with Objectivism as formulated by Ayn Rand, as shown in this example: “In regard to the scope of honest error, for example, both Peikoff and I appeal to the basic principles of Objectivism in defense of our respective positions, and both of us argue that the other’s position is not compatible with those principles. Even if it could be shown—and I do not think it can be shown—that Ayn Rand would take Peikoff’s side on this issue, the question would remain: which position is in fact consistent with the basic principles of Objectivism? That question must be decided by logic, not authority.” (p. 79) )

This absence of even a general outline for forming valid principles is logical, insofar as Kelley’s previous conflation of principles implies that new data may always call into question even the most rigorously defended and logical principles that could ever be formed. Unlike science, I’ve noted, philosophic principles do not require “confirmation” or revision in light of new technology, data, or specialized knowledge; Kelley’s contrary protestation that philosophic principles need at least to incorporate new inductive data to be valid (such “new data” that never ends, I should note), while offering no cognitive guidance on how to go about doing this, causes the collapse of the open system/Kelley’s “scientific view of principles” into skepticism of principles.

Ironically, Kelley’s scientific solution to his skeptical attitude towards philosophic principles simply leads to more skepticism, this time of his scientific take on principles (which he doesn’t elaborate on).

Paraphrasing Mrs. Hsieh: The perplexed open system advocate will ask “What will we do if Ayn Rand was wrong?!?”

Kelley’s response? “Who knows?!?”

(Later in the series: Part 4, Part 5)

Roderick Fitts is a former Vice-President of the University of Michigan Students of Objectivism.

Closed System vs. Open System: Why the Open System Fails (Part 2 of 5)

(Previous in the series: Part 1)

Kelley’s Misunderstanding of Philosophic Principles vs. Scientific Principles

The amount of context needed to be certain of principles differ vastly between philosophy and science.

Philosophy, as Ayn Rand and Leonard Peikoff note, deals with the kind of issues men can face in any era. The inductive data needed to formulate philosophic principles–or understand and accept an older one–or to correct or rightfully reject a mistaken one–is accessible to any man, and only requires that he mentally engage in understanding the relevant facts. The principle of measurement-omission in concept-formation, to give an example, can be grasped by anyone willing to actually consider the nature of how we form concepts, assuming he has already grasped certain prior principles, such as our existence as volitional beings, and of a mind-independent reality (i.e. Primacy of Existence). (See: http://aynrandlexicon.org/lexicon/conceptformation.html for explanations of “measurement-omission”)

Science deals with issues that require more delimited contexts, such as more specialized knowledge (e.g. a high degree of mathematical knowledge), and special equipment (e.g. a telescope or a cloud chamber); consequently, not all men in any era can reach all scientific principles. Related to this is that the inductive data needed to verify a given element of scientific knowledge depends on many factors; factors which may involve grasping new relationships, correcting mistaken or misapplied past information, new technology which can properly test a proposed theory, and even the combination of different scientific fields (e.g. biochemistry). Because new technology and new knowledge may reveal insights which previous theories couldn’t anticipate, the theories in science are constantly tested against this progress in order to determine their validity; or need of reformulation and/or revision; or our need to overturn a previous theory in favor of a better theory.

David Kelley, I now realize, seeks to conflate this distinction between confirming philosophic principles and scientific principles. As he says in T&T, “[b]y the very nature of inductive knowledge, [philosophic principles] are subject to further confirmation, qualification, or revision”; philosophic principles, since they are not self-evident like axioms, are not “evidentially closed.” (p. 78 of the second edition)

But he is mistaken: a philosophic principle which is true, which corresponds to reality, is something that the person who grasps it can be certain about; no amount of new data or change of context could invalidate the principle. Among any of us who understand the role of measurement-omission in concept-formation, what possible different context or new observational data could invalidate Rand’s insight that this is how human beings abstract from particular entities on up to more complicated issues (e.g. theory-formation)? Will a new table or new scientific principle show that we in fact do not consider tables’ shapes in relation to other objects, their measurements, and mentally retain the shape but omit the particular measurements (e.g. length) when we unit the referents (e.g. actual tables) into a new concept? In addition, new data doesn’t “further confirm” logically valid principles: when I grasp the principle that measurement-omission is integral to the process of conceptualization, I’m certain of it; applying the principle to a new topic, such as forming the concept “nominalism,” makes me more certain about measurement-omission and its relationship to forming concepts, not that it is a principle. Although Kelley claims that we might find “certain concepts to which the theory of measurement-omission seemed inapplicable,” his lack of any examples causes me to consider this claim baseless (in addition, I consider his dropping “measurement-omission” from his list of “fundamentals” of Objectivism to be arbitrary as well). (p. 78 ) Well-grounded philosophic principles, once the relevant data is understood enough for one to grasp them, are “evidentially closed.”

Context, using Peikoff’s definition, is the “sum of cognitive elements conditioning an item of knowledge”; it is the ideas, observations, and particular things which allow one to cognitively process, validate, understand the meaning of, and properly apply some type of knowledge, whether a concept, principle, or even a quote. (Objectivism: the Philosophy of Ayn Rand, p. 123; I will use OPAR for shorthand) The context of philosophic principles, and thus our means of grasping correct principles while avoiding and/or opposing erroneous principles, consist of the objects and living things we daily deal with (particularly other human beings), the environment around us, our own minds, and its mental processes. Kelley doesn’t completely deny this, saying that the philosophic “issues are ‘available’ only in the sense that the relevant facts can be grasped without specialized research.” (p. 77 ) What he denies is that the knowledge and correct intellectual procedures (e.g. asking the “right questions” and gaining the right perspective on some facts) needed to grasp these issues are revealed in a self-evident fashion upon observing the relevant facts, which is the view he attributes to Peikoff. (p. 78 )

(Comment: Anyone who understands the chapter on “objectivity” in OPAR knows that Peikoff certainly does not support that view, which is obviously mistaken (we wouldn’t need philosophy courses to grasp the self-evident). I also assume that Peikoff’s original lecture course “The Philosophy of Objectivism” from 1976 states similar points about integrating one’s new ideas, and since Peikoff is an Objectivist, I presume he agreed with the points he was making back then, Kelley’s accusation notwithstanding.)

Kelley gives the example of how it took centuries of intellectual development for the concept “individual rights” to be grasped, in order to contest Peikoff’s claim that men in any era can deal with philosophic issues. Speaking of the same example, he notes that the Greeks “could have observed” the facts which both required the formation of the concept “individual rights” and which would have validated it. (ibid; Bold in quote mine.) What I think is salient here is that the context needed to grasp the concept of “individual rights” was available to the Greeks, but the only way for them (or for anyone else) to grasp it was to engage in mental work, seek relationships among the relevant facts about human beings (and any other relevant facts), and integrate their new principle with their already established knowledge.

The context (including the inductive data) needed to form a given philosophic principle is available “to all men in all eras,” but this is not a sufficient condition for actually forming a principle: to form it, a man must already understand the logically prior principles and/or axioms, and he must try to relate a new principle to his already-established knowledge. The fact that a man doesn’t grasp a philosophic principle at one point in time, and later in history someone else does, does not mean that the former didn’t have the necessary context, as Kelley claims. It does mean that philosophic principles, to be grasped, require a commitment to seek new knowledge (among other things), which men can choose not to do (or fail to do properly).

(Comment: Again, I give my thanks to Diana, in this case for her entry “Ayn Rand on David Kelley” on Noodlefood: http://www.dianahsieh.com/blog/2005/07/ayn-rand-on-david-kelley.html)

(Later in the series: Part 3, Part 4, Part 5)

Roderick Fitts is a former Vice-President of the University of Michigan Students of Objectivism.

Closed System vs. Open System: Why the Open System Fails (Part 1 of 5)

Introduction and Key Points Concerning the “Open” and “Closed” Systems

It’s been about a year since I first encountered the “Closed System vs. Open System” or “Leonard Peikoff vs. David Kelley” issue, and about 9 months since I sided with the closed system advocates (in my facebook note: Why I Support the Closed System).

I’d like to point out that I didn’t completely understand the issue when I wrote that note, and I now regard my reasons given back then for siding with the “closed system” side as weak. To give examples, I had not yet grasped the relevant difference between philosophy and science to dispute David Kelley’s claim about the need to revise and reformulate principles already accepted as “Objectivist,” and I lacked an understand of exactly why Objectivism was a proper noun, as I hadn’t progressed sufficiently through the epistemology to know this.

After giving it a lot more thought, interacting with Ayn Rand Institute staff and affiliates, noticing the Objectivism-related material pouring from ARI members and supporters, and re-reading the papers central to the dispute, I can properly defend my stance as a “closed system” advocate. I’d especially like to thank Diana Hsieh for posting her thoughts about this dispute, including her disagreements concerning the “open system” view that Kelley and The Objectivist Center espouse.
(Comment: My interaction with the ARI has consisted of hosting speakers for the University of Michigan Students of Objectivism college lectures, taking courses at the Objectivist Academic Center, and most recently attending a summer conference about “Atlas Shrugged and the Moral Foundations of Capitalism.” While the issue of the “open/closed system” never arose in my dealings with ARI, my dealings with them helped in confirming that the accusations made about closed system advocates were strawmen and unjust.)

Now, I will name what I regard to be the key points of both the “closed” and “open” view, and afterward comment on four things:

(1) How the closed system is supported in academia, and why they’re correct in upholding it.
(2) Kelley’s view of using philosophic principles in essentially the same manner as scientific ones, and why he is mistaken.
(3) My reasons for characterizing the “open system” as I have here.
(4) Why the closed system is misunderstood and addressing several strawmen attributed to it.

Closed System:
1. Objectivism is the integrated whole of philosophic ideas, principles, and consequences (of said principles) expressed by Ayn Rand in published form, and material from others she agreed to include as part of Objectivism (e.g. Peikoff’s lecture course “The Philosophy of Objectivism”) Due to the nature of integrated systems, any change of an element within Objectivism would have disastrous effects on the entire system, wrecking it.

2. New implications, applications, and integrations can always be discovered and learned by Objectivists, but these are to be considered separate from the actual philosophy as developed by Ayn Rand. One could say that some new work (e.g. one of Tara Smith’s book on Rand’s ethics) is “in the Objectivist tradition” or “Objectivist” in the broad sense that it is logically consistent with the philosophy, but is not an actual addition to the philosophy.

3. Objectivism is an abstract particular—a proper noun which refers ostensively to the philosophy of Ayn Rand. Specifically, the set of philosophical abstractions, principles, and ideas espoused by her. As an abstract particular, it refers to the same mental content which all of us possess who know anything about Objectivism.
(Comment: To grasp how “Objectivism” is a proper noun, I suggest thinking more about the differences between concepts and proper nouns. For example, the concept “car” is an abstract particular in that it refers to the same mental contents in all of us who can identify cars; there doesn’t exist a “meta-concept” of “car” which is formed by omitting the measurements of our concepts of “car.” Please see Diana Hsieh’s interview with Axiomatic Magazine for more on this, which can be found on the Wayback Machine’s archive: http://web.archive.org/web/*/http://www.axiomaticmagazine.com/article.php?iss_index=3&art=4)

Open System:
1. Objectivism is, in effect, equivalent to: all true ideas and principles discovered in philosophy, and to be discovered in the future. Beyond the self-evidence of axioms, all ideas and principles are subject to revision, reformulation, and/or qualification.

(Comment: In a sense, not even the axioms are safe from revision, etc. because there exists specific reasons why we need axiomatic concepts, specific functions that they serve and that are not self-evident; more specifically, it’s the function of axiomatic concepts as “underscorers of primary facts” which makes it epistemologically necessary to formulate axiomatic concepts into formal axioms—into a “base and a reminder.”  (see Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology 2nd ed. ch. 6 and p. 260; p. 59) )

2. There is no inherent need to integrate the principles which are, at any given moment, determined to be “Objectivist.” Under the “open system,” the principle that knowledge is contextual (and therefore calls for integration of one’s new insights into one’s previous knowledge) need not be heeded, as principles are always subject to future revision.

3. Objectivism is to reflect the epistemological approach taken in regards to science, where principles must constantly be tested and confirmed by new data, reformulated or even outright changed when the data suggests such a policy.

4. Skepticism of the truth of principles is the consequence of this view. Because there is never a “full context” in which to ground a principle, one can always doubt that one even has a valid principle.

Academia and Closed Systems
In my understanding, philosophic systems (e.g. Aristotle’s philosophy, Hume’s philosophy) are closed systems in the same manner that I’ve indicated above, and this is how they are treated in academia. For instance, in my 402 course on Aristotle, the class wrote papers which interpreted areas of Aristotle’s thought; even if the papers stated ideas which were logically consistent with Aristotle’s philosophy, they wouldn’t have been considered additions to the actual philosophy.  At best, they were “Aristotelian” or “related to the philosophy of Aristotle.”

Generally, this has been my experience as an undergrad philosophy student and reader of scholarly works: philosophies are specific sets of principles laid out by the philosophies’ authors, and while new implications, applications, etc. can be drawn out by others, these do not become part of the respective philosophies. Contrary to Kelley’s view from ch. 5 of “Truth and Toleration” (T&T), Peikoff’s claims of philosophies being closed systems do have “precedent” and “foundation.” (p. 72; For the online text, see: http://www.objectivistcenter.org/cth–40-Objectivism_Chapter_5_Truth_Toleration.aspx )

The “precedent” is the practice of scholars carefully separating the works of a philosophy’s originator from the works of followers, which has gone on for centuries. The “foundation” is the cognitive need to separate Rand’s philosophy from both future developments (e.g. “Neo-objectivism”) and from other distinctive philosophies (e.g. Pragmatism and Platonism), and more broadly the need to do this with every other philosophy.

(Comment: In my view, it is this cognitive need which leads to forming proper nouns for people’s theories, philosophies, and other mental products; a similar case involves actual people, whereupon we need a shorthand tag to cognitively differentiate among the various people we encounter, a function served by proper nouns.)

(Later in the series: Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5)

Roderick Fitts is a former Vice-President of the University of Michigan Students of Objectivism.

Intelligent Design vs. Evolutionary Theory: A Brief Comparison

I. Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution, called natural selection, stated that different species originated from shared ancestors, with the differences in the organisms being caused by adaptations to different environments. The environment determines which species are best fit to survive, and the traits of the organisms are passed down to new generations. With enough time, such passages of traits could lead to whole new species. This theory was developed after more than two decades of observations, studying thousands of animal and plant samples, all with extraordinary inferences drawn from observed similarities and differences.

II. Intelligent Design (ID) is essentially a negative argument: the forces at work, whether natural selection or something else, are not sufficient to bring about aspects of life which we observe, such as humans—therefore, there must have been an intelligent designer. The appearances of organisms, then, have nothing to do with the survival success of their ancestors, like in natural selection: the intelligent designer brought life about quickly in all the various forms we observe today, as opposed to the slow process theorized in natural selection.

III. Using the evidence I’ve seen for both proposals, I’ve concluded that evolutionary theory better explains the phenomena of different life-forms. I’ll establish why I think so by considering the simplicity, explanatory power, and predictive success of both ideas.

IV. In terms of simplicity, I think that evolutionary theory wins hands down. Speaking about ontological complexity, both ideas incorporate the existence of various life-forms, but with Intelligent Design one must also include the existence of the designer, as well as the tools used in the design. In addition, a problem is raised regarding the origin of the existence of the intelligent designer; since it has abilities far more complex than even the current abilities of human beings, are we to suppose that it too was designed? In respect to dynamic complexity, both theories appear to accept the reproductive capabilities of organisms (I’m not sure about Intelligent Design), but Intelligent Design is the more complex nonetheless. Natural selection would imply the existence of biological processes which explain the similarities between offspring and parent organisms; such a thing isn’t too hard to believe because we can observe reproduction in organisms, meaning that something must be functioning within them which allows for such a thing. But Intelligent Design posits the existence of design processes outside of what goes on in reproduction, which have to be more complex because such designing gives rise to not just one type of organism, like a calf, but a multitude of organisms.

V. Evolutionary theory also wins in regards to its explanatory power. Through the fossil records, the gaps between species are bridged; fossils indicate a transitional stage from one type of organism to another, just as Darwin believed would be the case. Intelligent Design cannot account for such transitional fossils, and every fossil found sheds greater light on the bridges between species and the weakness of ID’s hypothesis.

VI. ID’s argument of irreducible complexity, which argues against evolution, fails to explain life forms because certain organisms have parts which are similar to other organism’s parts, but serve different purposes which lend support to evolution. A great example of this was the bacterial flagellum, which ID posits as an organism with an irreducibly complex motor; its motor has a similar structure to a syringe-like part belonging to the Yersinia pestis bacterium, and this is because they are made of the same kind of protein, but the Yersinia simply lacks the number of proteins need for the motor. Despite missing such proteins, the structure functions as an apparatus for carrying diseases, particularly the Bubonic plague; this is hard evidence that this motor then is not “irreducibly complex.”

VII. Lastly, I think evolution sort of wins by default in regard to predictive success, even though its success is astoundingly positive. ID offers no predictions. After its initial claims regarding the designing of species, it is silent regarding the implications of such designs, if any—meaning that there is nothing for scientists to test. Whereas evolution offers a plethora of predictions, with no scientific discoveries ever found which contradict such predictions in over 150 years. Darwin’s prediction about the fossil record was proven true, and modern genetics has recently proven Darwin’s contention of a common ancestry of humans and apes. In fact, every observation and experiment made, whether in molecular biology or modern genetics, has only confirmed the truth of evolution’s theory. This shows evolution to be an argument with a high degree of predictive success.

VIII. The conclusion then is that whether one looks at simplicity, explanatory power, or predictive success, it is clear that Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection trumps the idea of Intelligent Design, and demonstrates a coherent and testable prediction regarding the origin of species.

Notes and References

Some of the material for this essay is from the PBS video “Judgment Day: Intelligent Design on Trial.”